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INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme
Court held that state laws prohibiting same-sex marriages
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the
U.S. Constitution. 1 This ruling completed one of the swiftest
* Stephen F. Befort is the Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, and Bennett
Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School.
** Michael J. Vargas is an attorney at Rimon Law, P.C., in Palo Alto, CA.
He received his J.D. in 2013 from the University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
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and most dramatic sea changes in public opinion and legal
status in recent history. In 2005, ten years earlier, only 36%
of adult Americans supported the institution of same-sex
marriage, 2 and only one state—Massachusetts—recognized its
legality. 3 By 2010, those numbers rose to 42% 4 and six states, 5
respectively. Following the Obergefell ruling, 57% of American
adults supported same-sex marriage 6 and its legality was
established in all 50 states. 7
But these numbers mask another reality. Opposition to
same-sex marriage remains strong and fervent. A Barna
Group survey conducted shortly after the Supreme Court’s
ruling found that 43% of American adults disagreed with the
Court’s decision. 8 That survey also indicated that 94% of
theologically-defined evangelical Christians strongly oppose
same-sex marriage. 9 Conservative religious leaders 10 and GOP
presidential hopefuls 11 have vowed to continue their opposition
to same-sex marriage, despite the Obergefell ruling. As Tony
Perkins, President of the Christian Family Research Council
summarized: “It is folly for the Court to think that it has
resolved a controversial issue of public policy.
By

2. Pew Research Center, Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High,
but Key Segments Remain Opposed, (June 8, 2015), available at
http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/08 (hereinafter “Support for Same-Sex
Marriage”).
3. Freedom to Marry, History and Timeline of the Freedom to Marry in the
United States, (last updated June 26, 2015), available at http://www.
freedomtomarry.org/pages/history-and-timeline-of-marriage. See Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
4. Pew Research Center, supra note 2.
5. Marriage Equality USA, Facts at a Glance, (last updated July 8, 2015),
available at http://www.marriageequality.org/facts_at_a_glance.
6. Pew Research Center, supra note 2.
7. Marriage Equality USA, supra note 5.
8. Barna Group, Christians React to the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage,
(July 1, 2015), available at https://www.barna.org/barna-update/culture/723christians-react-to-the-legalization-of-same-sex-marriage-9-keyfindings#.Vp2r4HhD2FJ.
9. Id.
10. Tamara Audi & Jacob Gershman, Religious Groups Vow to Fight Gay
Marriage Despite Supreme Court, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (last updated June
26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/religious-groups-vow-tofight-same-sexmarriage-despite-supreme-court-1435329751.
11. Fredreka Schouten & Paul Singer, GOP Presidential Candidates
Denounce
Gay-Marriage
Ruling,
USA
TODAY
(June
26,
2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/2015/06/26/supreme
-court-gay-marriage-presidential-candidates/29337835/.
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disenfranchising 50 million Americans, the Court has instead
supercharged the issue.” 12
One of the likely battlefields for this opposition is the
American workplace. As exemplified by the facts in Koren v.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co., supervisors who oppose same-sex marriage
may act on that belief by harassing or terminating an employee
who has entered into such a union. 13 In that case, the plaintiff,
Jason Koren, married in a state that recognized lawful samesex marriage and adopted his spouse’s last name. 14 Upon
returning to work, his supervisor began to harass him because
the supervisor could not accept that a man would marry
another man, and the employer eventually terminated Koren’s
employment. 15 Because federal anti-discrimination law, as
embodied in Title VII, does not include “sexual orientation”
among its list of protected classes, 16 it is not clear that most
federal courts would find such conduct to be unlawful
This Article contends that such conduct properly should be
treated as unlawful “sex” discrimination based on two
different, but complementary, theories. First, discrimination
in response to same-sex marriage involves sex-based
stereotyping grounded in the belief that marrying someone of
the same sex constitutes gender-nonconforming behavior.
Second, such conduct involves actionable relational or
associational discrimination akin to a situation in which an
employer takes adverse action against a white employee
because of the fact that the employee has an African-American
spouse.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains the
accepted meaning of the terms “sex,” “gender,” and “sexual
orientation,” pointing out their relationships and differences in
order to create a common language for understanding the
analysis throughout the remainder of the Article. Part II
explores the development of Title VII’s sex discrimination
jurisprudence first as a general matter and then as it relates

12. Carol Hopkins, Religious, Conservative Groups Opposed to Gay Marriage
Vow to Fight Supreme Court Ruling, THE OAKLAND PRESS (June 26, 2015),
http://www.theoaklandpress.com/article/OP/20150626/NEWS/150629646.
13. Koren v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1034–35 (N.D. Ohio
2012).
14. Id. at 1034.
15. Id. at 1034–35.
16. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2015).
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specifically to cases that the courts have defined as “sexual
orientation” cases. Part III chronicles the development of the
sex-stereotyping theory as a basis for Title VII liability. Part
IV introduces the concept of relational discrimination under
Title VII and follows its development in both the race and sex
contexts. Finally, Part V argues that employees treated
adversely due to being in a same-sex marriage should fall
within Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination both by virtue of
engaging in gender non-conforming behavior and, more
directly, as relational discrimination.
I. SEX, GENDER, & SEXUAL ORIENTATION
America is a “sex”-based culture, in that most of our
cultural expectations, presumptions, and prohibitions are tied
to the accident of birth that leaves some with penises and
others with vaginas. 17 Once “sex” has been established,
“gender” is then built up around it, creating a gloss of cultural
meaning and expectations regarding attire, behavior,
mannerisms, career tracks, and life goals. 18 As the feminist
existentialist Simone de Beauvoir observed, “one is not born a
women, but rather becomes one.” 19 Like “gender,” “sexual
orientation” is another extension of and gloss on a person’s
“sex” and generally understood to mean the emotional or
physical attraction by a person of one sex to members of the
same sex, opposite sex, or both. 20
For the average American, these concepts are aggregated
into an expectation that males are masculine and attracted to

17. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation
of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161,
166, 175 (1996) (comparing America’s sex-based culture to the gender-based
culture of ancient Greece as a means of illustrating the differences between the
two concepts). The term “sex” is generally understood to mean biological or
physical differences, most notably external genital anatomy, though the term can
also be used to denote chromosomal differences. There is some discussion in the
feminist literature, however, suggesting that “sex” can be understood as social
constructed as well. See Judith Butler, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). While there is some merit to this view, adopting
that view would needlessly complicate the matters discussed herein.
18. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing
the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American
Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 n.6 (1995).
19. Butler, supra note 17, at 1.
20. Valdes, supra note 18, at 6 n.7.
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females, while females are feminine and attracted to males. 21
Until only recently, judges reaffirmed and institutionalized
these expectations, which led to a legally enforced system of
gender roles. 22 In response, feminist legal scholars proposed
the disaggregation of sex and gender in the law. 23 They pointed
out that femininity was not an essential trait of womanhood,
but rather a socially constructed one. 24 Yet, because society
conflates the two, judgments regarding a person’s gender
necessarily implicate his or her sex as well. 25 For example, an
employer who terminates a male employee for being too
effeminate has made a judgment that his gender expression
(femininity) is inappropriate in relation to his biological sex
(male). The termination would, therefore, stem from an
expectation that gender and sex ought to be aligned, and
therefore implicates both sex and gender.
The relationship between “sex” and “sexual orientation” is
somewhat more complicated, but no less essential. Sexual
orientation is the relationship between an individual’s sex and

21. Valdes, supra note 18, at 12.
22. The most famous example of this is Justice Bradley’s concurrence in
Bradwell v. Illinois, where he states:
The civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as
in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The
harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, or
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general
constitution of things . . . .
83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
23. See Butler, supra note 17, at 8.
24. See Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963) (chronicling the
frustration of women forced into the role of homemaker and mother, and
challenging the stereotype that men alone should be the “breadwinners” of the
family); see also Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex
Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 247 (1965) (criticizing
newspaper advertisements and state protective laws as based on gender
stereotyping women into certain roles).
25. Valdes, supra note 18, at 12.
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the sex of their romantic or sexual partner. 26
Sexual
orientation, therefore, derives its meaning entirely from the
existence of sex. Without knowing the sex of both partners, a
judgment regarding sexual orientation could not be made. 27
Sex and sexual orientation are also often conflated by the social
phenomenon of heterosexism, i.e., the preference for and
expectation that males will partner exclusively with females
and vice versa. In a way, this too is a cultural gloss on the
notion of sex, suggesting that sexual orientation must also be
related to gender. 28
This section is intended to highlight the interrelatedness
of these three terms.
Professor Valdes illustrates this
interconnectedness as the three corners of a triangle, each
distinct but still necessarily connected by the “legs” of the
triangle. 29 Particularly in the employment discrimination
arena, courts have taken an overly narrow view of these
The next section will explore the judicial
concepts. 30
understanding of “sex” and “sexual orientation” under the
rubric of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
II. SEX AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORKPLACE
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful
employment practice . . . to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . . .”31 The “sex” provision was added in an
amendment, and though it may have been proposed for
nefarious purposes, it found sufficient support from both
26. Valdes, supra note 18, at 15.
27. Valdes, supra note 18, at 18 (“if the sex and gender components of sexual
orientation discrimination are disaggregated from sexual orientation, virtually
noting remains to classify as discrimination ‘ “ based’ ” on sexual orientation.”).
28. See Zachary A. Kramer, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing
Gender-Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465, 490 (2004) (“employers and coworkers often harass gay
and lesbians in gender based terms because the act of homosexuality . . . is not
the behavior that they commonly associate with how a ‘real man’ or a ‘real woman’
is supposed to behave.”).
29. See Valdes, supra note 18, at 13.
30. See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual
Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 715,
739–40 (2010).
31. Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e), supra note 16).
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conservative and progressive lawmakers to make its way into
the final bill. 32 Unfortunately, the scant legislative history and
the general lack of knowledge regarding “sex” and “gender”
during this time period combined to create no shortage of
confusion, debate, and disagreement regarding the scope of the
new “sex” provision. This section will explore the evolution of
sex discrimination law under Title VII beginning with the
decade following its passage and continuing through the recent
developments in the treatment of gays and lesbians.
A. The Complicated History of Title VII’s “Sex” Provision
In the early interpretations of the sex provision, courts
tended to limit the ban on sex discrimination to biologicallyrelated distinctions. In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., for
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opined that the
“manifest purpose” of Title VII was “to ensure that men and
women are treated equally.” 33 The Holloway court went on to
state that the meaning of the term “sex” in Title VII
encompassed only “the traditional definition based on
By focusing on the binary
anatomical differences.” 34
distinction between biological males and females, these courts
ignored the broader implications of gender-related nuances
with respect to identity and behavior. 35
In 1976, the Supreme Court adopted and compounded this
narrow analysis. In General Electric Company v. Gilbert, the
Court considered a disability plan that excluded coverage for
32. The addition of “sex” to the list of protected categories was proposed by
Virginia Rep. Howard Smith. The “Smith Amendment” surprised many in the
House, as Smith was known as an ardent opponent of women’s rights, which lead
to the assumption that it was designed as a “poison pill” that would kill the Act.
See 110 Cong. Rec. 2581 (statement of Rep. Green). Still, there is evidence that
the true motive may have been to protect white women being discriminated
against in favor of black women. See id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Andrews).
The Amendment also received the strong support of pro-women’s rights
lawmakers, who believed the amendment would help free women from legally
enforced gender roles and “protective legislation” that kept women in low paying
jobs. See id. at 2578 (statement of Rep. Griffiths); id. at 2580 (statement of Rep.
St. George).
33. Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977).
34. Id. at 662; see also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th
Cir. 1984) (stating that Title VII only prohibits discrimination against “biological
male(s) or biological female(s) . . . .”).
35. See Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects ContraGender Behavior, 40 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 277, 280 (2005); McGinley, supra
note 30.
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pregnancy. 36 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist adopted
a narrow anti-classification approach, holding that Title VII is
violated only when the effect of a classification is to
“discriminate against members of one class or another.” 37
Because the benefits of the disability plan accrued to both
sexes, Justice Rehnquist concluded, “as there is no proof that
the package is in fact worth more to men than women, it is
impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect.” 38
Although Congress quickly overturned the decision, 39 the
narrow anti-classification approach continues to influence the
law through the widespread use of comparators: employees
“who are similar to the complainant in all respects but for the
protected characteristic . . . .” 40 As a heuristic, the use of
comparators is popular because it allows the court to draw the
inference that the protected characteristic, being the only
difference, must have been the cause of the disparate
treatment. 41 Over time, the comparators heuristic morphed
into a required element of proving sex discrimination for many

36. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976).
37. Id. at 408 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–48 (1976)).
38. Id. at 409.
39. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), supra note 16) (“The [term] ‘because of
sex’ . . . include[s] . . . because of . . . pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions . . . ”); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462
U.S. 669, 678 (1983) (“When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it
unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning
of the Court in the Gilbert decision.”). Despite the seemingly unambiguous
language of Congress and the Supreme Court, some lower courts have continued
to hold that conditions related to pregnancy are not covered. See, e.g., Derungs
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 893 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that
a ban on breast-feeding was not discrimination “because of sex . . . ”).
40. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728,
731 (2011); see also Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d
Cir. 2001) (“In the run of the mill discrimination cases . . . a plaintiff can make a
showing of disparate treatment simply by pointing to the adverse employment
action and the many employees who suffered no such fate.”).
41. Goldberg, supra note 40, at 744–45 (“because of their utility in producing
inferences of discrimination, comparators have emerged as the predominant
methodological device for evaluating discrimination claims”). Professor Goldberg
also argues that the comparators heuristic fits with traditional “judiciallegitimacy preferences that favor clearly defined and identifiable categories . . .”
as well as for analysis that appears to “turn on ‘facts’ rather than normative
judgments.” Id. at 740; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping
Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1955 (2006); Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social
Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629 (2002).
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judges. 42 Though the Supreme Court has never explicitly
endorsed such a requirement, some members of the Court have
signaled their support for such an approach. 43 This has led to
no small amount of scholarly criticism, as the comparators
heuristic, though useful, is woefully under-inclusive in light of
contemporary understandings of sex and gender. 44
In 1986, the Court recognized “sexual harassment” as a
second form of prohibited discrimination under Title VII, 45 a
form of discrimination recognized more than a decade earlier
with respect to race discrimination. 46 In Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, the Court considered the claim of a bank teller, who
was sexually harassed by her supervisor and eventually agreed
to engage in sexual relations with him. 47 Drawing on a racegender analogy, the Court concluded: “Sexual harassment

42. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’r, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 1995)
(“plaintiff must show that this employer treated similarly situated employees
outside his classification more favorably than herself.”); see also Paluck v.
Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000); Norville v. Staten
Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999); but see Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l.
Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[plaintiff] is not required as a
matter of law to point to a similarly situated white comparators in order to
succeed on a race discrimination claim.”).
43. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 611 (1999) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“one who alleges discrimination must show that she ‘received
differential treatment vis-à-vis members of a different group on the basis of a
statutorily described characteristic.’ ” ); see also id. at 617 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
44. Goldberg, supra note 40, at 742 (“The judicial default to comparators
crowds out not only other heuristics, but also other more textured conceptions of
discrimination, all of which is to the detriment of discrimination jurisprudence
and theory.”).
45. The court recognizes two forms of sexual harassment: “quid pro quo”
harassment and “hostile work environment” harassment. “Quid pro quo”
harassment is found where some job-related status is conditioned on acceptance
of a sexual advance. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
“Hostile work environment” harassment is found where an employer creates a
work environment so “heavily charged” with sex discrimination “as to destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers.”
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (citing Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
22 (1993); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998); Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998); see also Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
46. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 242 (holding “hostile work environment” claims
actionable as race discrimination); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City
of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514–15 (8th Cir. 1977).
47. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 60.
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which creates a hostile or offensive work environment is every
bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace
that racial harassment is to racial equality.” 48 Though the
Court has continued to recognize “sexual harassment” claims,
this cause of action has been considerably narrowed over the
past twenty years. 49
In 1989, the Supreme Court recognized a third cause of
action in the form of the “sex stereotyping” theory of sex
discrimination. 50 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a female
associate at a large accounting firm was denied a partnership
48. Id. at 66–67 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.) Race-gender analogies
were not uncommon at this time. Professor Murray first used these analogies in
her path-breaking law review article challenging the widely held belief that sex
discrimination was a less severe problem than race discrimination. See Pauli
Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, supra note 24. For a more thorough discussion of
race-gender analogies in the women’s rights movement see Serena Mayeri, “A
Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical
Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001).
49. The courts have limited the “sexual harassment” line in many ways.
First, the Supreme Court created an affirmative defense to liability and damages
where the employer took reasonable steps to prevent or promptly correct the
sexual harassment and the employee failed to take advantage of the preventative
or corrective opportunities. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
771. Second, the lower courts have rigorously construed the requirement that
sexual harassment must be “severe and pervasive” in nature. See, e.g., Duncan
v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 932, 934 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting as
insufficiently severe the claims of a female employee whose supervisors maligned
her as the president of the “man haters club,” arranged to have her arrested, then
took her to a bar and tried to force her to write a list of misogynist statements).
Third, a circuit split has also grown around the question of whether to apply the
standard to the individual events or the entire situation in the aggregate.
Compare Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1547 (10th Cir. 1995)
(analyzing each instance of alleged discrimination individually to determine if
the instance was “severe”) with Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553,
562 (6th Cir. 1999) (analyzing the “totality of the circumstances” to determine of,
in the aggregate, the discrimination was “severe and pervasive”). Fourth, in a
particularly troubling development, the courts have also taken it upon
themselves to determine whether the sexual harassment was objectively
“unwelcome,” a highly dubious requirement that has led to at least one infamous
and hugely embarrassing judicial pronouncement. See Burns v. McGregor
Electronic Industries, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 506, 508–09 (N.D. Iowa 1992)
(concluding that a female employee could not have been objectively offended by
her employer’s sexual harassment because she has previously posed naked for a
magazine), rev’d, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
50. Judge Posner questions whether Price Waterhouse actually created a
separate cause of action or whether the court intended for sex-stereotypes to serve
merely as evidence of sex discrimination. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod., Inc.,
332 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring). Most of the courts
reviewing sex discrimination, however, have treated sex stereotyping as a
separate cause of action.
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because she failed to conform to the feminine image and
demeanor expected by her superiors. 51 She was told she should
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.” 52 Painting with broad strokes, the Court interpreted
Title VII “to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions.” 53 In so doing, the court set aside anticlassification heuristics and adopted a broad view that focused
more on the intent of the perpetrator, even when the result
does not categorize people into easily distinguishable
comparators. Relying on this new understanding, the Court
found: “In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.” 54 The Court concluded, “we are beyond the day when
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group . . . .” 55
In 1998, the Court took a step forward and a step back in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services. 56 In that case, a male
employee was brutally harassed and physically assaulted by
his co-workers. 57 The Court held that same-sex sexual
51. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234–35 (1989).
52. Id. at 235.
53. Id. at 240.
54. Id. at 250. The lower courts have applied logic similar to this passage
from Price Waterhouse in a number of recent decisions targeting policies that
unfairly prohibit mothers from finding work. See Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc.,
561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding that a woman who was denied a
promotion because she had three children could make a sex-stereotyping claim
under Title VII); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d
107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that stereotyping women as “caregivers” can
by itself be an impermissible, sex-based motive).
55. Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1791. The Court’s use of “gender” and
stereotyping, which implicates socially constructed gender, has led to the
conclusion by many judges and scholars that “sex” and “gender” are both
protected under Title VII. However, the Supreme Court has not definitively
adopted this position.
56. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001–03
(1998).
57. Id. at 1001. “Oncale alleges that the harassment included Pippen and
Johnson restraining him while Lyons placed his penis on Oncale’s neck, on one
occasion, and on Oncale’s arm, on another occasion; threats of homosexual rape
by Lyons and Pippen; and the use of force by Lyons to push a bar of soap into
Oncale’s anus while Pippen restrained Oncale as he was showering on
Sundowner premises.” Oncale v. Sundownder Offshore Srvs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118,
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harassment could rise to the level of actionable sex
discrimination, resolving a split among the circuit courts. 58
Responding to strict textualist criticisms, the Court stated,
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed.” 59 This surprising step
to expand the coverage of Title VII gave many commentators
hope that the Court was opening the door to an even broader
interpretation of sex discrimination. 60 Those hopes may have
been premature, as the Court also included narrowing
language. Oncale listed only three ways in which a plaintiff
could prove actionable same-sex harassment, leading a few
lower courts to conclude that those paths are exclusive. 61
This brief history offers three insights relevant to
discrimination based on sexual orientation and same-sex
relationships. First, the use of comparators provides a useful,
though imperfect, methodology for determining whether sex
discrimination has occurred, and the courts rely heavily, in
some cases even exclusively, on this method. Second, another
useful heuristic is the use of race-gender analogies, which may
reveal discrimination that would normally be veiled by our
118–19 (5th Cir. 1996).
58. Compare Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451–52 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding same-sex sexual harassment unprotected under Title VII);
Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); with McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding samesex sexual harassment actionable only where the harasser is homosexual); Doe v.
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding same-sex sexual harassment
actionable, and applying the same standard as opposite-sex sexual harassment).
59. Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002.
60. See generally Matthew Fedor, Can Price Waterhouse and Gender
Stereotyping Save the Day for Same-Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Under Title
VII? A Careful Reading of Oncale Compels an Affirmative Answer, 32 SETON
HALL L. REV. 455 (2002).
61. Justice Scalia held that sex discrimination could be shown by (1)
“credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual,” (2) “general hostility to the
presence of women in the workplace,” or (3) “comparative evidence about how the
alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace” (i.e.
comparators). Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002. This led the Fifth Circuit to conclude
that these categories were exclusive. E.E.O.C. v. Boh Brothers Construction Co.,
689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012). There is also a split within the Sixth Circuit on the
question of exclusivity. Compare Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services, Inc., 682 F.3d
463 (6th Cir. 2012) (assuming that the Oncale categories were exclusive); with
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir 2004) (applying sex stereotyping
theory to find transsexuals protected under Title VII).
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preconceived notions and prejudices regarding socially
constructed gender roles. Third, though the courts have
struggled in determining the reach of this cause of action, it is
clear that Title VII prohibits the use of sex stereotypes in
employment decisions. As discussed below, these three
insights are crucial to understanding how and why Title VII
should apply to same-sex relationships, but first some
discussion is necessary as to how courts have treated sexual
orientation under Title VII.
B. Sexual Orientation
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit heard the case of Kenneth
Ulane, a decorated veteran who was terminated after having
surgery to become female. 62 Illinois District Court Judge
Grady’s opinion in the case was an early attempt to
disaggregate sex and gender, holding, “sex is not a cut-anddried matter of chromosomes,” but involves society’s
perception of the individual. 63 Unfortunately, the Seventh
Circuit was not as progressive, and summarily reversed,
holding that “sex” should be given its “ordinary, common
meaning.” 64 The Court found support for this conclusion in the
“dearth of legislative history” and the fact that Congress had
attempted and failed to amend Title VII to include
“affectational or sexual orientation.” 65 Although the case did
not involve a homosexual plaintiff, the Ulane court’s’ logic has
become the foundation for limitations in sex discrimination law
relating to sexual orientation and non-conforming gender

62. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Although
this case was not about sexual orientation, it is important to remember that
during this time there was still substantial bias against all forms of gender nonconforming behavior whether it was homosexuality or “transexualism,” and the
courts tended to treat the two as one and the same. See also Holloway v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
63. See Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825. Judge Grady’s prophetic decision has
enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent years. Both commentators and
judges have looked to that decision, rather than the majority decisions in this and
other early transgender cases, as instructive on the proper interpretation of sex
discrimination. See generally Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212
(D.D.C. 2006) (“it may be time to revisit Judge Grady’s conclusion in Ulane I that
discrimination against transsexuals because they are transsexuals is ‘literally’
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’ ” ).
64. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
65. Id.
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identities. 66
The courts have universally held that sexual orientation is
not a protected class under Title VII. 67 For example, in 1979
the Ninth Circuit held in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co. that: “Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’
discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of
gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual
preference such as homosexuality.” 68 Although the courts do
occasionally decry discrimination against gays and lesbians, in
the absence of any evidence of discrimination based on some
other protected status such as race or sex, they will not hold an
employer liable for discrimination under Title VII. 69
To a certain extent, however, it is perhaps more accurate
to say that “homosexuality” is not a protected class. In contrast
to the clearly unprotected status of homosexual employees, the
courts have utilized Title VII to protect heterosexual
employees in two notable instances.
First, heterosexual employees are protected from
homosexual supervisors, even when the harassment is
triggered not by attraction or sex, but by the heterosexual
status of the employee. 70 In Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America,

66. See Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081; see also Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d
1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean ‘biological
male or biological female,’ and not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation.”;
Siminton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“we are informed by Congress’
rejection, on numerous occasions, of bills that would have extended Title VII’s
protection to people based on their sexual preferences.”); Etsitty v. Utah Transit
Authority, No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610 (D. Utah 2005) (“Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination based on an individual’s transsexualism” ), aff’d on
other grounds, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
67. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259
(1st Cir. 1999) (“[it is] settled law that, as drafted and authoritatively construed,
Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation.”).
68. DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30
(9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
69. See e.g., Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Center, 224 F.3d
701 (7th Cir. 2000); Siminton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“We hold
no brief for harassment because of sexual orientation; it is a noxious practice,
deserving of censure and opprobrium . . . [but] Title VII does not proscribe
harassment simply because of sexual orientation.”); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989).
70. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th
Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996);
Johnson v. Community Nursing Services, 985 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Utah 1997);
Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., Civ. A. No. 93-2351, 1995 WL
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a young heterosexual male was sexually harassed when his
homosexual co-workers discovered his sexual orientation. 71
The court found that his sex was the “but for” cause of the
harassment because no women were subjected to the same
harassment. 72 The court, however, overlooked the fact that no
homosexual men were similarly harassed, and the harassment
was triggered, not by sex, but by the discovery that the
employee was heterosexual. 73 Thus, sexual orientation, rather
than sex, was clearly the motivating factor for the harassing
conduct. Conversely, when the harassment is perpetrated by
a bisexual or heterosexual supervisor, the courts are rarely so
protective of the employee victim. 74 The Supreme Court has
241855 (E.D. La. 1995). The Supreme Court approved of this “homosexual
supervisor” avenue in Oncale. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Srvs., 118 S.Ct.
998, 1002 (1998). Unfortunately, the decision also forced judges into the
uncomfortable position of having to pass judgment on the sexual orientation of
defendants. See Shephard v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999)
(discussing at length whether evidence of mock flirtations and defendant
“rubbing himself into an erection” could constitute “credible evidence” of
homosexuality). As a result there arose a circuit split on the question of what
constitutes “credible evidence” of homosexuality. Compare La Day v. Catalyst
Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that “credible evidence”
includes either evidence of desire toward the plaintiff or evidence of propositions
made to other employees of the same sex); Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d
182 (5th Cir. 2012) (same) with Dick v. Phone Directories Co., Inc., 397 F.3d 1256
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that only evidence of sexual attraction toward plaintiff
could suffice as “credible evidence”).
71. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F.3d 138, 139–40 (4th Cir. 1996).
72. See id. at 143.
73. When the Pizza Hut hired a new male employee the homosexual
employees would “attempt to learn” the sexual orientation of the new employee.
Id. at 139. Only after the homosexual employees discovered that Wrightson and
other new employees were heterosexual did the harassment begin, and this
harassment was perpetrated by the homosexual employees against the
heterosexual employees. Id.
74. The “bisexual” or “equal opportunity” harasser has become a classic
defense to a sex discrimination charge. The defense is based on the assumption
that even if the supervisor engages in severe, pervasive, and unwelcome sexual
harassment, no liability will attach so long as he or she treats all employees in
the same manner. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
This is a classic, and heavily criticized, hole in the anti-classification approach to
discrimination law. See, e.g., Mark McCullough, One is a Claim, Two is a Defense:
Bringing an End to the Equal Opportunity Harasser Defense, 67 U. PITT. L. REV.
469 (2005); Kyle Mothershead, How the “Equal Opportunity” Sexual Harasser
Discriminates on the Basis of Gender Under Title VII, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1205
(2002); David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem
in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (2002); Shylah Miles,
Comment, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Defense: Eliminating the EqualOpportunity-Harasser Defense, 76 WASH. L. REV. 603 (2001).
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since approved this double standard in Oncale. 75
Second, heterosexuality as a sexual orientation is often
presumed and automatically subsumed into traditional sex
discrimination analysis. 76 On the other hand, same-sex
harassment triggers a variety of defensive analytical
mechanisms designed to prevent gays and lesbians from
raising “sexual orientation” claims. 77 In Meritor, for example,
which involved opposite sex harassment, the court discerned
impermissible sexual harassment without once mentioning the
sexual orientation of the employee, even though it could easily
have been argued that the harassment resulted not from the
female employee’s sex, but from her supervisor’s perception as
to her sexual orientation, i.e., her potential willingness to
engage in sexual activity with someone of the supervisor’s
gender. 78 On the other hand, courts often fixate on a plaintiff’s
homosexual orientation to assume the absence of gender-based
discrimination. 79
Thus, heterosexuality enjoys a privileged status under
Title VII. Heterosexuality is often treated as part and parcel
with “sex,” while homosexual plaintiffs are denied the same
assumption and must prove both that they were discriminated
because of their sex and not because of their sexual
orientation. 80 This double standard creates an artificially high
barrier for LGBT plaintiffs in Title VII cases, a barrier which
we must address in arguing that discrimination against legal
same-sex marriages, although arguably a subset of sexual
orientation related cases, should nonetheless be covered within

75. See Oncale v. Sundownder Offshore Srvs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002
(1998).
76. Kramer, supra note 28.
77. See Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting the
Heterosexist Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE L. J. & FEMINISM 375, 393 (1995) (“the
courts’ explicit and consistent refusal to apply Title VII to cases of harassment or
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, while the rhetoric of sexual
harassment law suggests that employees are protected from harassment which
targets their sexuality, they are in reality protected only from harassment which
targets their heterosexuality”) (emphasis omitted).
78. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66.
79. See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
205, 229-32 (2009).
80. See Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1158, 1159 (1991); Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto
(An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1992); see also Grose, supra
note 77, at 393.
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the current Title VII paradigm.
However, the more
conventional avenue of “sex-stereotyping” is also available to
protect LGBT Americans who enter into legal same-sex
marriages, and it is to this principle that we now turn.
III. SEX-STEREOTYPING DISCRIMINATION
Despite this rejection of “sexual orientation” as a protected
class, most courts still allow gay and lesbian plaintiffs to
maintain claims based on sex or race without having their
sexual orientation automatically defeat those claims. 81
However, this has created some difficulty for the courts as
society’s evolving understanding of sex and sexual orientation
can make it hard to distinguish between gender claims and
sexual orientation claims. 82 Many gay men find themselves
subjected to anti-gay barbs not because they are gay, but
because they fail to conform to the strictures of masculinity. 83
At the same time, many heterosexual men are subjected to
anti-gay epithets, not because they fail to conform, but as a
means of emasculation. 84 These behaviors illustrate the
81. See Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 575 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We
have never made the viability of sexual harassment claims dependent upon the
sexual orientation of the harasser, and we are convinced that it would be both
unwise and improper to begin doing so.”); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country
Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222–23 (D. Or. 2002) (“Nothing in Title VII suggests
that Congress intended to confine the benefits of that statute to heterosexual
employees alone. . . .If an employer subjected a heterosexual employee to the sort
of abuse allegedly endured by Heller . . . the evidence would be sufficient to state
a claim for violation of Title VII. The result should not differ simply because the
victim of the harassment is homosexual.”).
82. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In
all likelihood, any discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable
under a sex stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all
homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their
sexual practices.”); see also Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d
Cir. 2005) (“it is often difficult to discern when Dawson is alleging that the various
adverse employment actions allegedly visited upon her by Bumble & Bumble
were motivated by animus toward her gender, her appearance, her sexual
orientation, or some combination of these”).
83. See McGinley, supra note 30, at 716 (“Masculinities research
demonstrates that much harassing behavior directed at gays and transsexuals
occurs because of sex or gender . . . [t]he victim is harassed because he or she . . .
is perceived to be insufficiently masculine to continue in the job.”).
84. See Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other
Forms of Heterosexual “Horseplay:” Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace
Gender Hierarchies, and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After
Oncale, 11 YALE, J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 196–97 (1999) (“the derision directed at
these males who project an insufficiently masculine sexuality frequently includes
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interrelated nature of gender and sexual orientation. This
interrelatedness defies the rigid distinctions demanded by
courts’ current sex discrimination jurisprudence that
distinguishes between actionable gender discrimination and
permissible sexual orientation discrimination.
Sexstereotyping theory offers an alternative avenue for plaintiffs
that is not quite as black and white.
Following Price Waterhouse, Title VII plaintiffs began to
allege sex-stereotyping claims to challenge adverse actions
taken in response to gender non-conforming behavior. In
general, these claims invoked Title VII’s sex provision citing a
discrepancy between an employee’s expressed gender behavior
as compared to the employee’s biological or anchor gender. 85
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nichols v. Azteca
Restaurant86 exemplifies this trend. That case involved the
claim of a male restaurant employee who was referred to as a
“female whore” and told that he carried his tray “like a
woman.” 87 The Ninth Circuit reviewed its earlier DeSantis
decision and concluded that it was no longer good law in light
of Price Waterhouse. 88 The court then applied the sex
stereotyping theory and found that the harassment was
“closely linked to gender” and actionable under Title VII. 89
Price Waterhouse, Nichols, and a few other cases 90 gave
advocates hope that the sex-stereotyping route might offer gay
and lesbian employees some protection from anti-gay
harassment in the workplace. 91
epithets or comments insinuating that the target is homosexual.”). One need not
be a feminist scholar or queer theorist to recognize that sexual orientation is often
used as a stand in for sex-based oppression, particularly in all-male
environments. The use of anti-gay slurs such as “fag,” “faggot,” or “queer,” serve
to emasculate the target, implicitly suggesting that they are feminine or
insufficiently masculine. See, e.g., Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia, 183 F. Supp.
2d 726, 736 (E.D. Pa. 2002); E.E.O.C. v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., Civ. A. No.
1:06-CV-2560-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
85. See Kramer, supra note 28, at 485–86.
86. Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir.
2001).
87. Id. at 870.
88. Id. at 875.
89. See id. at 874.
90. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Pregerson, J., concurring); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F.
Supp. 2d 1212 (D.Or. 2002); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass.
2002).
91. See Olivia Szwalbnest, Discriminating Because of “Pizzazz”: Why
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In spite of decisions like Nichols, courts for many years
had a difficult time ascertaining the appropriate dividing line
between protected gender non-conforming behavior and the
unprotected status of sexual orientation, even in cases of sexstereotyping. 92 As a result, courts, in practice, were more apt
to reject stereotyping claims when asserted by gay, lesbian, or
transgender plaintiffs than when asserted by straight
plaintiffs or plaintiffs whose sexual orientation was
unknown. 93 In essence, some courts treated the former group
of plaintiffs as if their status automatically trumped their
gender non-conforming behavior. 94
The most common analytical method for rejecting sexstereotyping claims asserted by homosexual and transsexual
employees has been for courts to resort to the “antibootstrapping” principle. 95 In Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble,

Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation Evidences Sexual Discrimination
Under the Sex-Stereotyping Doctrine of Title VII, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75, 90–
91 (2011) (arguing that sexual orientation is a trait that should itself be treated
as protected gender non-conforming behavior); but see Ryan M. Martin,
Comment, Return to Gender: Finding a Middle Ground in Sex Stereotyping
Claims Involving Homosexual Plaintiffs Under Title VII, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 371,
392–94 (2007) (arguing that the fact that an employee is dating someone of the
same gender should not be protected as gender non-conforming behavior).
92. See McGinley, supra note 30, at 738–39 (stating that “the cases
demonstrate that drawing this line is virtually impossible.”).
93. See Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and Manhood, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 287,
304 (2011) (“if a claim makes any mention of homosexuality, then it is a sexual
orientation claim and must fail. And because the cultural stigma attached to
homosexuality is so overwhelming, the deck is stacked against lesbian and gay
employees who seek to raise gender-stereotyping claims, as courts tend to view
their sex discrimination claims through the lens of homosexuality.”); see, e.g., Kay
v. Indep. Blue Cross, 142 Fed. Appx. 48, 2005 WL 1678816 (3d Cir. 2005)
(concluding that attacks on his gender non-conformity, such as taunts about not
being a “real man” because he wore an earring, were really discrimination based
on sexual orientation and not sex.).
94. See Kramer, supra note 28, at 304 (stating that “[o]nce a court identifies
an employee as gay or lesbian, the court makes itself hyperaware of the
employee’s homosexuality, thereby enabling the employee’s homosexuality to
swallow all other aspects of the employee’s identity.”).
95. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) ;
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2005); DeSantis v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Appellants now
ask us to employ the disproportionate impact decisions as an artifice to ‘bootstrap’
Title VII protection for homosexuals under the guise of protecting men
generally”); but see Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“explaining how Price Waterhouse “would not bootstrap protection for sexual
orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically
feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine.”).

1_BEFORT FINAL

226

3/25/2016 2:33 AM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

for example, a homosexual female employee was referred to as
“Donald,” told she needed to “have sex with a man,” and
informed that her non-conforming appearance was a
“costume.” 96 Despite these rather obvious examples of sex
stereotyping, the Second Circuit found the record “devoid” of
evidence of sex discrimination. 97 The court reasoned that
“stereotypical notions about how men and women should
behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about
heterosexuality and homosexuality,” but rather than
acknowledging that sexual orientation could be protected in
those instances, the court created an artificial distinction,
stating, “gender stereotyping claim[s] should not be used to
bootstrap protection for sexual orientation.” 98
Just as the specter of homosexuality tends to cloud the
judicial lens with respect to stereotyping claims, some courts
also have been unable to look beyond male gender stereotypes
in cases involving the sexual harassment of gay men. In
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, the Seventh Circuit
applied a “horseplay” exception to shield the employer of an allmale workplace from the sex discrimination claim of an
employee. 99 In Hamm, a male employee whose co-workers
suspected that he was gay was referred to as “girl scout,”
accused of having a sexual relationship with a co-worker,
mocked as potentially interested in sexual relations with other
male employees, and threatened with sexual assault. 100
Unable to see beyond the gendered preconception that
“sexually explicit remarks among male coworkers may be
simply expressions of animosity or juvenile provocation,” the
court held that “it is difficult to separate many of Hamm’s
complaints from the significant amount of horseplay that
occurred.” 101 Because the “horseplay” exception is itself based

96. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2005).
97. See id. at 221.
98. Id. at 218.
99. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, (7th Cir. 2003).
The “horseplay” exception is particularly popular as a means of excusing sexually
explicit and sometimes even abusive conduct in all-male employment situations.
The exception is based on the idea that it is socially acceptable for men to “behave
badly” in the workplace. Because, all of this “bad behavior” is simply expected of
men, it cannot possibly be because of sex. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Harbert-Yeargin,
266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
100. Id. at 1060–61.
101. Id. at 1063–64.
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on stereotypes regarding acceptable male activity, particularly
in the workplace, it has been heavily criticized in legal
commentary. 102
The Sixth Circuit’s 2004 decision in Smith v. City of
Salem 103 represented a major turning point in sex-stereotyping
jurisprudence. In that case, Smith, a biologically male
firefighter, was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder.
After the diagnosis, Smith began “expressing a more feminine
appearance on a full-time basis.” 104 Smith’s behavior resulted
in comments from co-workers, who felt that Smith was not
Smith discussed these
acting “masculine enough.” 105
comments with a supervisor and informed the supervisor that
Smith’s treatment eventually would include a physical
The supervisor
transformation from male to female. 106
discussed the situation with other managers who devised a
plan to require Smith to undergo three psychological

102. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 84, at 157–58 (“sexual exploitation,
domination, intimidation, and abuse of men by other men constitutes a longoverlooked form of gender discrimination that asserts the dominance of the
masculine over the feminine and thus reflects and perpetuates deeply-rooted
patterns of gender inequality. Such conduct focuses intensely on portraying the
target as a passive, feminized recipient of the harasser’s aggressive
stereotypically masculine sexual advances. As a result, the conduct echoes and
enforces entrenched notions of male dominance in which power is identified and
allocated based on the possession of stereotypically masculine physical and
behavioral characteristics such as larger physical size, superior physical
strength, aggressiveness, and sexual assertiveness.”); McGinley, supra note 30,
at 725 (“[b]y openly abusing men who do not conform to gender stereotypes, men
police the social and gender order at work, reinforcing the definition of certain
jobs as ‘masculine’ and closed to non-conforming men and most women.”). The
courts’ willingness to see “deeper” motivations in sexually charged language is
somewhat perplexing. Since the courts appear willing to look past the superficial,
it stands to reason that they could also look just one step deeper still to discover
that the use of these terms, though not immediately motivated by “sex,” still
evince a hostility to “sex” or “women” or both, and have the practical effect of
making the workplace a more hostile environment. See L. Camille Hebert, Sexual
Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 574 (1995) (“sexual
epithets often directed at women, such as ‘cunt’ and ‘bitch,’ clearly reflect the
gender-based nature of the animus that motivate them.”). Thus, the courts’
“horseplay” jurisprudence seems to be nothing more than an effort to cherry-pick
those motivations convenient to their conclusion, while ignoring others.
103. Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th. Cir. 2004). See Ling,
supra note 35, at 285 (stating that “Smith upturns rigid sex categories and allows
both sexes to participate in the full range of gender expressions”).
104. Id. at 568.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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interviews in the hope of pressuring Smith into resigning. 107
Smith sued the city under Title VII for sex discrimination
based on gender-nonconforming behavior. The district court
ruled that Smith’s status as a transsexual precluded such a
claim. 108
The appeals court rejected the district court’s ruling as
well as its logic. The court criticized those decisions that
elevated status over behavior and held that “a label, such as
‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where
the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her
gender non-conformity.” 109 The court then went on to find that
Smith’s claim fit squarely within the zone of forbidden sexstereotyping:
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates
against women because, for instance, they do not wear
dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination
because the discrimination would not occur but for the
victim’s sex. It follows that employers who discriminate
against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or
otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex
discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur
but for the victim’s sex. 110

Since the Smith decision, most courts have ruled that
sexual orientation or transgender status does not
automatically defeat a sex-stereotyping claim. 111 A number of
decisions, in fact, have held that a plaintiff’s sexual orientation
should have no bearing at all on the validity of a claim based
on gender nonconformity. 112
107. Id. at 568–69.
108. Id. at 569, 574.
109. Smith, 378 F.3d at 575.
110. Id. at 574.
111. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Construction, Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir.
2013); Glenn v. Bumbry, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Business
Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2009); Koren v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 894
F. Supp.2d 1032 (N.D. Ohio 2012); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp.2d 293
(D.D.C. 2008); see also Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL
1435995 (EEOC, April 20, 2012) (EEOC ruling that a transgender job applicant
could maintain a complaint against a federal agency both under a sexstereotyping theory and as a matter of direct sex discrimination); but see Etsitty
v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2008) (ruling that
discrimination against a transsexual employee because of that employee’s status
does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII).
112. See, e.g., Glenn v. Bumbry, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating
that “[a]ll persons, whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimination
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Some commentators have argued that homosexuality is
itself a gender non-conforming trait and therefore
discrimination against all homosexuals should be subsumed
under the sex stereotyping theory. 113 Stated another way, this
theory posits that because society expects males to be attracted
to females and vice versa, heterosexuality is a gender
stereotype. Therefore, discrimination against homosexuals is
discrimination because they fail to conform to an expectation
attached to their sex, i.e., the expectation that they are
attracted to the opposite sex. 114
Two federal district court decisions have arguably adopted
this line of thought. In Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country
Club, a lesbian chef was harassed by her supervisor for having
a relationship with another woman. 115 Her supervisor would
ask her, “[d]o you wear the dick in the relationship?” and “[a]re
you the man?” 116 In denying the employer’s motion for
summary judgment, the U.S. District Court for Oregon held
that:
[A] jury could find that [the supervisor] repeatedly
harassed (and ultimately discharged) Heller because Heller
did not conform to [the supervisor’s] stereotype of how a
woman ought to behave. Heller is attracted to and dates
other women, whereas [her supervisor] believes that a
woman should be attracted to and date only men. 117

The U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, in Centola v.
Potter, made a similar observation, opining, “stereotypes about
homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes about the

on the basis of gender stereotype”); Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d
285, 292 (3rd Cir. 2009) (stating “[t]here is no basis in the statutory or case law to
support the notion that an effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender
stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not”); Centola v.
Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating that “if Centola can
demonstrate that he was discriminated against ‘because of . . . sex’ as a result of
sex stereotyping, the fact that he was also discriminated against on the basis of
his sexual orientation has no legal significance under Title VII.”).
113. See Kramer, supra note 28, at 468; Szwalbnest, supra note 91, at 90–91.
114. Such an approach would alleviate a key deficiency of relying on the Price
Waterhouse line of cases to achieve protection for gays and lesbians, namely that
not all homosexuals are gender non-conforming in their dress or behavior.
Kramer, supra note 28, at 468.
115. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224
(D. Or. 2002).
116. Id. at 1217.
117. Id. at 1224.
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proper roles of men and women . . . [t]he gender stereotype at
work here is that “real” men should date women, and not other
men.” 118
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), in two administrative decisions involving federal
employees, similarly has adopted a broad view of what
constitutes prohibited sex discrimination. In Macy v. Holder,
the EEOC ruled that the term “sex” in Title VII encompasses
both biological sex and gender, and that an employer who
discriminates because a person is transgender necessarily “has
engaged in disparate treatment ‘related to the sex of the
victim.’ ” 119 Similarly, in Complainant v. Foxx, the EEOC
stated:
[W]e conclude that sexual orientation is inherently a “sexbased consideration,” and an allegation of discrimination
based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of
sex discrimination under Title VII. A complainant alleging
that an agency took his or her sexual orientation into
account in an employment action necessarily alleges that
the agency took his or her sex into account. 120

Although these cases may be groundbreaking, they
currently represent a decidedly minority view among the
federal courts.
Thus, the prevailing reach of the sex-stereotyping theory
of sex discrimination can be summarized as follows: while the
status of being homosexual or transgender is not a protected
class, individuals who engage in gender non-conforming
appearance or behavior - regardless of being straight or gay are protected by Title VII’s sex provision.
IV. RELATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 121 IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Relational Race Discrimination
Between 1973 and 1985, a split developed among the U.S.
118. Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002).
119. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 at *6–
7 (EEOC, April 20, 2012)
120. Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641
at *6 (EEOC, July 15, 2015).
121. This Article uses the term “relational” discrimination instead of the more
traditionally recognized “associational” or “associative” discrimination.
Associational discrimination has taken on a broader meaning in the Title VII case
law, including claims where the spouse of an employee in retaliation for protected
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district courts regarding the question of whether
discrimination based on an interracial marriage created a
cognizable claim under Title VII. 122 In Ripp v. Dobbs Houses,
a district court in Alabama concluded that such discrimination
was not prohibited under Title VII. 123 The court reasoned that
the language of the statute required that the discrimination be
on account of “individual’s race” and, thus, where an employer
discriminates not because of the employee’s race, but because
of the race of the employee’s spouse, Title VII did not apply. 124
In Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, a
district court in New York rejected this argument, instead
holding that the claim was cognizable. 125 The court reasoned
“if Whitney was discharged because, as alleged, the defendant
disapproved of a social relationship between a white woman
and a black man, the plaintiff’s race was as much a factor in
the decision to fire her as that of her friend.” 126 In short, the
employee’s race is implicated because the discrimination is
based on that race being “different from the race of the people
[she] associated with.” 127
When the issue finally percolated up to the Eleventh
Circuit, the court sided with the “irrefutable” logic of the New
York district court. 128 In Parr v. Woodman of the World Life
Insurance Company, a white applicant was rejected from a
position after he made it known to the employer that he was
activity. This is a different scenario from the employer who discriminates
because of the employee’s protected status in relation to the protected status of
their spouse. Thus, a few scholars have begun referring to this latter form as
relational discrimination as opposed to associative discrimination in recognition
of these two different concepts. See generally Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift
From Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209 (2012).
122. Compare Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973)
(holding discrimination based on interracial relationships uncovered); Adams v.
Governor’s Comm. On Postsecondary Educ., No. C80–624A, 1981 WL 27101 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (same); with Reiter v. Center Consolidated Sch. Dist., No. 26–JT, 618
F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding interracial relationships protected);
Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Whitney v.
Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
123. Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 215 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
124. Id. at 208–10.
125. Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F.
Supp. 1366–67(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
126. Id. at 1366.
127. Reiter v. Center Consolidated Sch. Dist., No. 26-JT, 618 F. Supp. 1458,
1460 (D. Colo. 1985).
128. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir.
1986).

1_BEFORT FINAL

232

3/25/2016 2:33 AM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

married to a black woman. 129 The court reviewed the split in
the district courts, as well as prior decisions under section
1981—where the court had found interracial relationships
covered 130—and concluded that Whitney provided the most
compelling analysis. The court reasoned that Congress’ intent
to eradicate race discrimination ought not to be hampered by
“a combination of a strict construction of the statute in a battle
with semantics.” 131 The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits have all reached the same conclusion. 132 Not a single
court in the past thirty years has held otherwise. 133
The concept of relational discrimination is not limited to
interracial marriage.
It applies more broadly to any
discrimination where the employee is targeted because of his
race in relation to the race of someone else. In Tetro v. Elliot
Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, for
example, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case of a car dealer
who was terminated after his biracial daughter came to visit
him at work. 134 The Court found that “the dealership has been
charged with reacting adversely to Tetro because of Tetro’s
129. Id. at 889.
130. Section 1981 states: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Prior
to Parr, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits had concluded that
discrimination based on interracial relationships was prohibited under this Act.
See Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1980); Fiedler v. Marumsco
Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980); Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956
(5th Cir. 1975); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975). In
Parr, the Eleventh Circuit officially adopted this conclusion as to section 1981,
791 F.2d at 890.
131. Parr, 791 F.2d at 892 (quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d
888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)).
132. Holcomb v. Iona College, 251 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008); Tetro v. Elliot
Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994–95
(6th Cir. 1999); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156F.3d 581, 589
(5th Cir. 1998); Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1992).
133. The District of Columbia Circuit has criticized the conclusion that section
1981 covered interracial relationships arguing that it may create a standing
issue. Fair Emp. Council of Greater Wash. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1279 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1994). However, they are alone in their criticism, and even if
the D.C. Circuit were eventually vindicated, the Title VII and section 1981 are
not automatically coextensive.
134. Tetro v. Elliot Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, 173
F.3d 988, 990 (6th Cir. 1999).
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race in relation to the race of his daughter.” 135 In the court’s
view, “[t]he net effect is that the dealership has allegedly
discriminated against Tetro because of his race.” 136 Therefore,
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on the protected
status of the employee in relation to the protected status of
another individual.
B. Relational Sex Discrimination
Many cases categorized as “sexual orientation” cases in
the case law and commentary may actually be better
understood as relational sex discrimination cases. The Heller
decision discussed in the preceding section illustrates how
anti-gay harassment can be based not simply on anti-gay
animus, but also on animus toward same-sex relationships. As
the court noted in that case, “a jury could find [the supervisor]
repeatedly harassed (and ultimately discharged) Heller
because . . . Heller is attracted to and dates other women,
whereas [her supervisor] believes that a woman should be
attracted to and date only men.” 137
The impact of relational discrimination is demonstrated
by the facts, often overlooked, in a number of sexual
orientation cases. 138 In Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., an
effeminate male employee was subjected to anti-gay
harassment including being called “princess,” “rosebud,” and
“faggot,” along with a litany of other threatening and hostile
statements. 139 However, the discrimination also took on a
relational tone when Prowel was accused of having sexual
relations with other male employees, and a co-worker said to
him “a man should not lay with another man.” 140 Whether
because the attorney did not focus on the relational
statements, or because the court chose to ignore them, the
decision focused instead on the sex-stereotyping aspects of the
claim. 141
135. Id. at 995.
136. Id.
137. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224
(D.Or. 2002).
138. See, e.g., Lundin v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding against female plaintiff who was terminated for being in a samesex relationship).
139. Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2009).
140. Id. at 288.
141. Id. at 292.
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In some cases, however, the same-sex relationships are, in
fact, the root of the discrimination, rather than simply one
factor among many. In Valadez v. Uncle Julio’s, a lesbian
server was in a relationship with a female co-worker, when her
supervisor began asking to have a “tag team” with the
employee and her partner. 142 The court focused on the
“uninvited sexual solicitations” as creating a claim for
traditional sexual harassment, 143 but the employer’s
motivation, which is supposed to be the primary concern of
Title VII analysis, appears to have been based as much on a
fetishized view of lesbian relationships as it was based on his
desire for sex with the employee. In Ayala-Sepulveda v.
Municipality of San German, a male plaintiff was similarly
engaged in a sexual relationship with a male co-worker. 144
When that relationship ended the co-worker publicly denied
ever being in a relationship with the plaintiff and began to
threaten him with violent reprisal for “fabricating” the
relationship. 145 The discrimination this employee faced was
rooted not in his sexual orientation per se, but in the fact that
he had engaged in a relationship with another man. The
violent response of his partner only strengthens the conclusion
that the discrimination was “because of sex.” It is extremely
unlikely that the plaintiff would have been subjected to such
harassment if he were female; rather it was because the
plaintiff was male that his partner responded so violently in
defense of his masculinity.
The EEOC expressly recognized a relational or
associational claim of sex discrimination in Complainant v.
Foxx, an administrative decision involving a federal
employee. 146 In that case, the complainant alleged that he was
not selected for a permanent position because of his sexual
orientation. The decision explained that an employee can state
a claim of sex discrimination by showing that the employer’s
conduct was motivated by the sex of another person with whom
the employee was associating. Drawing an explicit analogy to

142. Valadez v. Uncle Julio’s, 895 F.3d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
143. Id. at 1014.
144. Ayala-Sepulveda v. Municipality of San German, 661 F.2d 130, 134
(D.P.R. 2009).
145. Id.
146. Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641
(EEOC, July 15, 2015).
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the race context, the decision concluded that “Title VII
similarly prohibits employers from treating an employee or
applicant differently than other employees or applicants based
on the fact that such individuals are in a same-sex marriage or
because the employee has a personal association with someone
of a particular sex.” 147
These cases illustrate that real or perceived same-sex
relationships are often the focal point of sexually charged
discrimination. Although most courts have attempted to
resolve these cases by looking to existing theories of sex
discrimination, such a practice ignores an important factor and
consequently one that reveals the inherently sex-based
characteristic of the discrimination.
Although same-sex
relationships in the form of marriage are now recognized as
lawful, incidents of discrimination such as these are likely to
remain an issue. Thus, we must reconcile the legalization of
same-sex marriages with not only the long history of judicial
skepticism toward sexual orientation discrimination claims
under Title VII but also the long accepted principle that
relational discrimination is prohibited under Title VII.
V. PROTECTING SAME-SEX MARRIAGES UNDER TITLE VII
A. Same-Sex Marriage Discrimination as SexStereotyping
When an employee experiences discrimination because of
their same-sex marriage, sex stereotyping is almost certain to
be at the core of the discrimination, or at the very least it will
be implicated by the discriminatory behavior, words, and
actions. This reality is illustrated by the circumstances in
Koren v. Ohio Bell, where a gay employee was discriminated
against when he entered into a legal same-sex marriage. 148
Koren and his partner had traveled to Massachusetts, where
they applied for and entered into a legal marriage. 149 The two
then returned to Ohio, where both were employed. 150 Upon his
return Koren received a legal name change, adopting his
husband’s surname. 151 When he returned to work at Ohio Bell,
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 9.
See Koren v. Ohio Bell, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (2012).
Id. at 1034.
See id.
Id.
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his supervisor became hostile toward Koren, objecting to his
marriage. 152 As part of the course of harassment to which
Koren was subjected, his supervisor refused to acknowledge
his new surname and continued to call him by his prior
name. 153 The court held that adopting a partner’s surname is
a traditionally feminine practice, and that the employer’s
adverse reaction could be actionable as sex stereotyping. 154
The Koren decision offers a blueprint for fitting same-sex
marriage within the protective ambit of the sex-stereotyping
theory. Traditional marriage involves a union between one
male and one female, and opposite sex marriage represents
In contrast, same-sex
gender-conforming behavior. 155
marriage, with or without an accompanying change in a
spousal surname, constitutes gender non-conforming behavior.
As such, an employer’s adverse treatment of an employee
because of a same-sex marriage violates the sex-stereotyping
principle established in Price Waterhouse and constitutes sex
discrimination for purposes of Title VII.
The act of same-sex marriage also goes well beyond status
and involves behavior that, even if now lawful, runs counter to
long-held societal expectations.
Unlike some workplace
perceptions, hostility to same-sex marriage cannot be confused
with—or
consumed
by—an
employee’s
unprotected
homosexual status. Given the now-recognized distinction
between status and behavior 156 and given that same-sex
marriage clearly involves a behavior that goes significantly
beyond a person’s status as homosexual, same-sex marriage
fits comfortably on the behavior side of the well-established
legal divide under Title VII.
B. Same-Sex Marriage Discrimination as Relational Sex
Discrimination
Protecting individuals on the basis of sexual orientation as
a relational concept under Title VII may be difficult since gays
and lesbians not in same-sex relationships would find it hard
152. Id.
153. Koren v. Ohio Bell, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (2012).
154. Id. at 1038.
155. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage: What It Is, Why It Matters, and
the Consequences of Refining It, available at http://www.heritage.org/research
/reports/2013/13.
156. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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to prove “relational” discrimination, not to mention that it
would naturally raise the “bootstrapping” concerns that have
so worried the federal judiciary.
However, protecting
individuals in same-sex marriages is a different matter
entirely, as it involves a specific and identifying relationship,
the objections to which are derived entirely from the sex of the
individuals involved. The relational dimensions of same-sex
marriages, therefore, require that they be protected under
Title VII’s widely accepted prohibition of relational
discrimination. This conclusion is further supported by the
two analytical heuristics most often utilized by the Supreme
Court: the race-gender analogy and the comparators heuristic.
1. The Race-Gender Analogy
It is clear that discrimination based on different protected
classes often bear similarities that illuminate the
The clear and
discriminatory character of the acts. 157
unequivocal intent of the Civil Rights Act was to “eradicate
race discrimination” and to “strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women.” 158 In outlawing
relational discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit held that this
goal ought not to be hampered by “a combination of strict
construction of the statute in a battle with semantics.” 159 The
invidious nature of discrimination against legally married
same-sex couples is that doing so allows employers to police the
private decisions of male and female employees in their
selection of intimate partners, a selection process that
implicates deeply held beliefs regarding a person’s sex and
gender. It was clear in 1967 that such conduct would amount
to discrimination if the policing involved the race of the
partner, and it is no less true today that it amounts to
discrimination when the policing involves the sex of a married
157. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleview, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 579 (7th Cir. 1997)
(“If an African American is repeatedly subjected to racial slurs and talk of
lynching by his co-workers, we typically do not ask, ‘But was he singled out
because of his race?’ . . . we understand that the harassment, perpetrated through
the vehicle of race, is discriminatory and injurious in and of itself, even if his
harassers wanted to make his life miserable for reasons altogether unrelated to
the color of his skin.”)
158. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978).
159. Parr v. Woodman of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir.
1986) (quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir.
1970)).
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partner. 160 In short, looking at discrimination because of a
same-sex relationship as compared to an interracial
relationship reveals that in either case, such discrimination
would have the “net effect” of perpetuating, rather than
eradicating, differential treatment based on a protected status.
As discussed above, a number of courts have recognized
that discrimination based on same-sex relationships is often
part and parcel of discrimination “because of sex.” 161 In Heller,
the employee in a same-sex relationship was bombarded with
inappropriate questions such as “[d]o you wear the dick in the
relationship?” and “[a]re you the man?” 162 These questions are
saturated with hostility to gender non-conformity, revealing,
as so often is the case, that discrimination because of sexual
relationships is based on sex or gender stereotypes, which act
to perpetuate gender hierarchies that disadvantage women
and gender non-conforming men. In Hamm, the hostility of the
environment to women and effeminate men is even clearer,
where an employee was threatened with physical violence for
simply having a close friendship with another man. 163
Instances like these make clear that discrimination based on
same-sex relationships is often part of a systematic effort to
police gender norms, preserve the masculine identity of the
workplace, and protect the masculine identities of the male
employees and managers. Thus, permitting employers to
police the decision of an employee’s romantic partner only
reinforces an environment that is hostile to all but the most
gender conforming men, a result that inimical to the goals Title

160. Mr. Theodore Schroeder, argues that this discrimination is based on the
sex of the partner rather than the sex of the employee, and, therefore, is not
protected. See Theodore A. Schroeder, Fables of the Deconstruction: The Practical
Failures of Gay and Lesbian Theory in the Realm of Employment Discrimination,
6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 333, 366 (1998). However, this view was rejected in the
relational line of cases as too narrow a view. The proper, and logical,
interpretation is that the discrimination is not based solely on the race (or sex) of
the spouse, but on the relationship between the employee’s race (or sex) and the
spouse’s race (or sex). The employee’s protected status is an essential element of
the discrimination. Indeed, the author’s failure to recognize that this was the
prevailing interpretation greatly undermines his challenge to contemporary
feminist scholarship.
161. See notes 137-147 and accompanying text.
162. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217
(D. Or. 2002).
163. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1060 (7th Cir.
2003).
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VII.

Where the discrimination is based not merely on a samesex relationship, but on a legally recognized same-sex
marriage, the connection to impermissible relational
discrimination becomes even clearer. In Koren, the animus did
not take on the usual anti-gay epithets, but rather the simple
refusal to recognize the same-sex marriage. 164 In such a case,
the discrimination is based not on the sexual orientation of the
employee, but on the fact that he was a man who chose to
engage in a lawful marital relationship with another man. As
the EEOC recognized in Complainant v. Foxx, this is relational
discrimination in its simplest and clearest form. 165
Ultimately,
discrimination
based
on
same-sex
relationships has the effect of reinforcing gender stereotypes,
perpetuating sex discrimination, and making the workplace
unsafe for all but a few gender conforming men. This
undoubtedly falls within the “spectrum of disparate treatment”
envisioned by the courts, and it mirrors the experiences of the
men and women who challenged social resistance to interracial
marriages. As such, same-sex marriages should be afforded
the same protection that was extended to interracial couples.
2. The Comparators Heuristic
The comparators heuristic requires that the courts
compare the employees’ treatment to that of other employees
“who are similar to the complainant in all respects but for the
protected characteristic.” 166 In Koren, a comparator would,
therefore, be a female employee who married a man and took
the surname of her husband. As the court in Koren notes, the
comparator’s scenario is the socially accepted norm. 167 Thus,

164. See Koren v. Ohio Bell, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–38.
165. Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641
at 9 (EEOC, July 15, 2015). In the broader realm of employment law, most states
have recognized a public policy exception to the employment at-will rule that
protects employees who exercise a statutory right, such as filing for workers
compensation benefits, from retaliatory dismissal. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor
and Employment Law at the Milennium: A Historical Review and Critical
Assessment, 43 BOSTON COL. L. REV. 351, 381–82 (2002). As a matter of policy,
an employee who exercises the statutory right to enter into a lawful same-sex
marriage also should be shielded from bias that operates to interfere with the
enjoyment of that statutory right.
166. Goldberg, supra note 40, at 731.
167. Koren, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
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even though the opinion does not reveal the treatment of
female employees, it is not a stretch to assume that they would
not be treated with the hostility that Koren experienced. More
often than not, therefore, a comparators analysis will heavily
favor a gay or lesbian employee who is discriminated because
they choose to enter into a same-sex relationship.
3. Addressing Calls for a Broader Application
Professor Victoria Schwartz recently argued that all
sexual orientation is inherently relational discrimination. 168
She asserts, “sexual orientation is an inherently relational
concept . . . if a female is discriminated against for being a
lesbian, she is discriminated against for her sex (female) in
relation to her sexual relationships with others (female).” 169
Schwartz further contends that protection for sexual
orientation should extend beyond relationships that actually
exist at the time of the discriminations, arguing “an employer
who is motivated by animus . . . likely is so motivated
regardless of the specific status of that employee’s
relationships.” 170 Schwartz is likely correct, but it is doubtful
that the courts will recognize her argument any time soon. The
current Title VII regime is based on the intent of the
perpetrator, 171 and gay and lesbian plaintiffs making use of
Schwartz’s argument could have a hard time making their case
without pointing to specific relationships of which the
employer was aware. Furthermore, as we have noted above,
anti-gay epithets can also be used as a means of discriminating
against gender non-conformity or as a means of emasculation.
Though both of these uses should be prohibited as “because of
sex,” neither can reasonably be characterized as relational in
nature.
Whatever the argument for a broader view of relational
discrimination, adverse action taken in response to same-sex
marriage, a specific and identifiable action that is inextricably

168. Schwartz, supra note 121 at 211–12.
169. Schwartz, supra note 121 at 248.
170. Schwartz, supra note 121 at 249.
171. Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Title VII is
clear that it is the harassers’ discriminatory animus and mental state that are
crucial to determining whether Title VII outlaws the harasser’s conduct . . . Thus,
while [the plaintiff]’s impression of why his fellow workers took these actions
against him is relevant, it is not conclusive.”).
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tied to a person’s sex, clearly is based upon the relationship
and the sex of the two marital parties. Protecting such a
relationship is not a giant leap, but a reasoned extension of the
protection afforded to interracial couples.
CONCLUSION
Much of sex discrimination law has become very
complicated and unpredictable. Against this murky landscape,
the proper treatment of same-sex marriages under Title VII is
simple and clear. Recognizing that discrimination based on
same-sex marriages is sex discrimination requires, at most,
only a basic understanding of the gender make up of those
relationships and the common sense application of existing and
widely accepted theories of Title VII liability. Discrimination
based on a same-sex marriage clearly qualifies as sexstereotyping retaliation in response to gender non-conforming
behavior. Since such discrimination is also based on the sex of
one partner in relation to the sex of the other, it is also classic
relational discrimination.
With same-sex marriage now
lawful, the courts will not be able to avoid incorporating these
relationships into employment discrimination law for much
longer. A common sense application of the current Title VII
regime demands that same-sex couples receive protection
under Title VII.

